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DISABLED WITHOUT BENEFITS: THE
IMPACTS OF RECENT SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORMS ON DISABLED CHILDREN
Abstract: In 1996, Congress passed sweeping reforms aimed at
overhauling the welfare system. The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") included a new
definition of childhood disability that, it is estimated, excluded
100,000 children from SSI benefits. This Note explains the changes
implemented within the childhood disability system and explains the
reasoning behind those changes. It then argues that the regulations
promulgated in response to PRWORA exclude truly disabled chil-
dren from receiving disability benefits. These regulations violate the
Social Security Act, are inconsistent with the stated policies of the So-
cial Security Administration and draw arbitrary distinctions, violat-
ing the legislative intent of the Social Security Act.
INTRODUCTION
Matthew is a nine-year old with a history of mild mental retarda-
tion, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), oppositional
defiant disorder ("ODD"), mild obesity and enuresis (nighttime bed-
wetting). 1 Matthew also struggles with nightly sleep disturbances and
migraines.2 Described as anxious and agitated, most of the time he is
unable to focus on tasks—even those he .enjoys—for more than a few
minutes.3 While most nine-year olds find themselves in the third or
fourth grade, Matthew continues to read at a first grade level and per-
forms math at the kindergarten level despite several years of special
education.4 Matthew acts aggressively toward other children and
lashes out at his parents and neighbors, in spite of months of individ-
ual and family counseling and other therapeutic behavioral interven-
1 See Memorandum from Jonathan Stein, General Counsel, Robert Lukens, Staff At-
torney and Richard Weishaupt, Senior Attorney, Community Legal Services, to Consor-
tium of Citizens with Disabilities Social Security and SSI Committee 9 (Feb. 1, 1999) (on
file with author).
2 See id.
I See id.
4 See id.
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tions. 9
 Matthew also has trouble dressing himself, even though he is at
an age where this task should be routine.6
As a result of the numerous disorders from which Matthew suf-
fers, his ability to function is severely limited. While none may be se-
vere enough individually to qualify him for disability benefits, the
combination severely limits his ability to function and should entitle
hint to receive benefits.? Despite this, Matthew has been denied Social
Security disability benefits twice—benefits that could be used to pay
for additional educational assistance and medications Matthew, and
thousands of other children like him, fell victim to new regulations
promulgated in response to the welfare reforms enacted by Congress
in 1996.9
This Note explores the issues associated with Congress's attempt
to redefine childhood disability in regard to disability benefits. Part I
traces the evolution of childhood disability benefits, including the
changing definitions of childhood disability and the various standards
used to determine whether a disability exists." Part II discusses the
reasons behind the 1996 Congressional reform and the anticipated
effects of the new disability standards." Part III analyzes the regula-
tions promulgated in response to the 1996 definition of childhood
disability and argues that the new regulations violate the Social Secu-
rity Act and are inconsistent with the stated policies of the Social Se-
curity Administration." Finally, Part IV argues that by denying chil-
dren like Matthew benefits, the new regulations draw arbitrary
distinctions and violate the legislative intent of the Social Security
Act."
I. DEFINING CHILDHOOD DISABILITY
In 1972, Congress enacted the Supplemental Security Income
("SSI") program under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the
"Act") . 14
 The program attempted to set a guaranteed minimum in-
5
 See Stein et al., supra note 1, at 9.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See infra notes 14-118 and accompanying text.
11
 See infra notes 119-46 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 147-230 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 231-47 and accompanying text.
14 See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329,
1465 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1994)).
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come level for individuals who had attained age sixty-five, or were
blind or were otherwise disabled." The Act, codified in section 42 of
the United States Code, defines the term "disabled" as the inability to
engage in "substantial gainful" activity because of a medically deter-
minable physical or mental impairment." According to the Act, the
impairments must be sufficiently severe to prevent an individual from
engaging in any substantial gainful activity given his or her age, edu-
cation and work experience." An impairment may result from ana-
tomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical techniques. 18
This definition of disability applied to both children and adults
until Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") as part of its welfare overhaul
in 1996." The reforms of the PRWORA amended the Social Security
Act by creating a new definition specific to children." The new
definition for children considers a child disabled if he or she can
demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
that results in "marked" and "severe" functional limitations. 21 To inn-
15 See id.; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 524 (1990).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (A) (Stipp. III 1997). This section provides:
[Ain individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this sub-
chapter if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve mouths.
Id.
17 See id. § 1382c(a) (3) (B). This section provides:
[Mil individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physi-
cal or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that be is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, educa-
tion, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work....
Id.
16 See id. § 1382c(a) (3) (D).
19 See Personal Responsibility and INork Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 211-212, 110 Stat. 2105, 2188-92 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a) (3) (C) (Supp. III 1997)).
29 See id. § I 382c (a) (3) (C) (i); Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62
Fed. Reg. 6407, 6408 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (C). This section provides:
(i) An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled for the
purposes of this subchapter if that individual has a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe func-
tional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has
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plement the new definition of childhood disability, the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") amended several regulations and created new
procedures for determining disability. 22
A. Childhood Disability Befog the PRWORA
Before the welfare reforms of 1996, childhood disability existed
as a subset of adult disability, noted only by a parenthetical statement
at the end of the adult definition.23 The Act provided that a child
qualified for disability benefits "if he suffers from any ... impairment
of comparable severity" to one that would render an adult "unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity."24 The Social Security regu-
lations require the SSA to perform a five-step evaluative process to
determine adult disability. 25 The first step inquires whether the appli-
cant is employed. 26 If an applicant is employed in substantial gainful
activity, they will not qualify for benefits. 27 If the applicant is not em-
ployed, however, the next step evaluates the severity of the applicant's
impairment. 28
 In the second step, if the applicant's impairment or
combination of impairments does not significantly limit the appli-
'cant's ability to perform basic work activities, the application is denied
in accordance with the regulations, without regard to the age, educa-
tion or work experience of the applicant. 26 Upon a determination
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
mouths.
(ii) Notwithstanding clause (i), no individual under the age of 18 who en-
gages in substantial gainful activity ... may be considered to be disabled.
Id.
22 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
25 See id at 6408.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (A) (1994). Determinations regal -ding whether a person
qualifies for disability—child or adult—may be made by the SSA, or by a State agency, such
as Disability Determination Services ("DDS"), or other designee of the Commissioner of
the SSA. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (e) (1997).
23 See 20 C.F.R. §416.920.
" See id. § 416.920 (b) .
27 See id.
28 See id. at § 416.920 (c) .
22
 See id.; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 148-49 (1987).1n 1987, in Yuckert, the
United States Supreme Court held that the severity regulation—step two of the determina-
don process—was valid. See 482 U.S. at 149-51. The regulation permits the denial of a
disability benefits claim on the basis of a determination that the claimant did not suffer
from a medically severe impairment significantly limiting the claimant's ability to perform
basic work activities. See id. The Court reasoned that the severity regulation increases]
the efficiency and reliability of the evaluation process by identifying at an early stage those
claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely they would be found
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that the applicant's impairment is severe, the impairment will then be
evaluated against a list of impairments" determined to constitute a
disability within the meaning of the statute. 31 In the third step, when
an applicant's impairment meets or equals .a listed impairment, the
applicant qualifies for SSI disability benefits. 32
If the SSA does not make a decision based upon the first three
factors, it will review the applicant's residual functional capacity and
the physical and mental demands of the work previously done by the
applicant." In the fourth step, an applicant who can continue to per-
form the kind of work done in the past will not qualify for disability
benefits.% The fifth and final evaluative step examines the residual
functional capacity of the applicant in light of age, education and past
work experience to determine whether the applicant is capable of
performing another form of work. 35 An applicant qualifies as disabled
if, given those considerations, he or she is determined to be unable to
perform the kind of work done in the past."
Initially, childhood disability was established by superimposing
the same adult disability framework on the child applicant." The ap-
plication process included an evaluation of a child's employment
status and an evaluation of whether the child's impairment met or
equaled the severity of a listed impairment." The procedure mirrored
the first three steps of the adult application process. 39 Because chil-
dren generally do not work, the SSA felt it was inappropriate to apply
vocational rules to children.° Therefore, the child's disability deter-
mination did not include steps four and five of the adult determina-
tion.41 As a result, the adult application process included two oppor-
to be disabled even if their age, education and work experience were taken into account.*
Id. at 153. This case resolved a split in the circuits as to whether the severity regulation was
valid and brought some litigation back to the court for redetermination on the validity of
disability claims. See generally Johnson v Heckler, 769 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1989); Ibckert v.
Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
" For the list of impairments see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
31 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
32 See id.
33 Sec id. § 416.920(e); see also Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62
Fed. Reg. 6407, 6408 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
34 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).
35 See id. § 416.920(0.
36
 See id.
37 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6408.
38 See id.
" See id.
4° See id.
41 See id.
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amities to prove that a disability existed, while children had only one
opportunity to show such a disability—by meeting or exceeding a
listed impairmen 1 42
B. The Sullivan v. Zebley Standard
In 1990, in Sullivan u Zebley, the United States Supreme Court
held that the child disability regulations were manifestly contrary to
the statutory standard of providing benefits to children with impair-
ments of "comparable severity" to that qualifying an adult for aid.43 In
Zebley, the respondent was a named member of a class of children
seeking a judgment that would entitle them to an administrative de-
termination as to whether they could receive SS! benefits or whether
the SSA improperly denied or terminated such benefits.'" The com-
plaint alleged that the regulations governing the granting of SSI
benefits violated the Act's comparable severity standard because the
regulations required children to have a listed impairment or the
medical equivalent of a listed impairment, whereas adults could meet
the disability requirements through alternative means. 45 In holding
that the regulations did not comply with the Act's comparable severity
provision, the Court stated that children claiming SSI disability
benefits were entitled to an individualized assessment as part of the
disability determination process, comparable to the determination for
adults who have impairments that do not meet or equal the severity of
a listing.46
 The Court reasoned that the disability listings were more
restrictive than the statutory standard; first, they did not cover all ill-
nesses and abnormalities that could be disabling, and second, the
medical conditions that were covered by the listings were defined by a
criteria "setting a higher level of severity than the statutory stan-
dard."47 Furthermore, the Court explained that the listings excluded
claimants whose impairments were not necessarily always disabling in
the larger population, but were particularly disabling to individual
claimants. 48 The Court explained that the equivalence analysis ex-
cluded claimants with severe yet unlisted impairments and those with
42 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6408.
43 See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 536-37.
44 See id. at 526-27.
45
 See id.
46 See id. at 535-37; see also Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed.
Reg. at 6408 (explaining the SSA's interpretation of Zebley).
47 Zebley, 493 U.S. at 533-34.
48 See id. at 534.
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a combination of impairments that did not meet the criteria for any
particular listed impairment:19 The Court reasoned that for adults,
the fact that the listings set a criteria above the statutory minimum
was remedied by the final two evaluative steps, which created a more
individualized assessment based on vocational abilities. 5° For children,
however, the absence of an individualized assessment denied them the
full protection of the statutory standard, possibly denying benefits to
children with the same disability as an adult. 51 The Court further
noted that although the vocational analysis used by the SSA to process
claims for adults was inapplicable to claims for SSI benefits for chil-
dren, that did not mean that some corresponding form of functional
analysis could not be applied to children's claims. 52 Therefore, the
Court held that the regulations violated the Act by failing to
sufficiently evaluate whether a child's impairment was of comparable
severity to that qualifying an adult for benefits. 53
In response to Zebley, the SSA revised the rules used to evaluate
childhood disability claims, promulgating several new regulations. 54
The Zebley standard defined comparable severity in terms of the im-
pact of an impairment or a combination of impairments on a child's
ability to function "independently, appropriately and effectively in an
age-appropriate manner."55 The SSA created an Individualized Func-
tional Assessment ("IFA") for children whose impairment, or combi-
nation of impairments, did not meet or equal the requirements of any
listing.56 The IFA evaluated the impact of the child's disability on his
or her overall ability to function independently, appropriately and
effectively in an age-appropriate manner. 57
The 1991 regulations created a three-step process to consider a
child's functioning, taking the place of steps four and five in the adult
determination process.58 At each step, the SSA evaluated the impact
of all the child's medically-determinable impairments on his or her
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 535-36.
52 See Zebley, 993 U.S. at 539-40; see also Determining Disability for a Child Under Age
18, at 62 Fed. Reg. 6907, 6408 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
" See Zeblty, 493 U.S. at 541.
54 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6408.
55 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (repealed 1996), quoted in Determining Disability for a Child
Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6408-09; see Zebley, 493 U.S. at 541.
55 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
57 See id.
68 See id.
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ability to function.59 Part of that determination included an evalua-
tion of the effects of the individual's symptoms and the side effects of
medication, the nature of the impairment, the age of the child, the
child's ability to be tested given his or her age, the child's ability to
perform age-appropriate daily activities and other relevant factors. 60
The first step served as a threshold for further evaluation. 61 It in-
quired into whether the "child had more than a slight abnormality, or
combination of slight abnormalities, that caused a more than minimal
limitation in a child's ability to function." 62 The second step provided
an expansion of the definition of "functional equivalence" and its re-
lation to the listing of impairrrients. 69 Previously, a child had to dem-
onstrate that an impairment met or medically equaled the severity of a
listing.64 Under the 1991 rules, a child could demonstrate a disability
if the functional limitations of a child were equal to those limitations of
a listed impairment. 65 This functional equivalence could be demon-
strated "without regard to whether the listed impairment chosen for
comparison was medically related to the child's impairment."66
The final step applied to children who failed to demonstrate that
an impairment met or medically equaled the severity of a listing, as
required by the second step. 67 The SSA would evaluate the functional
impact of a child's impairment through an IFA. 68 The IFA addressed
the functional impact of a child's impairment by viewing it through
broad areas of functioning known as domains and behaviors. 69 These
domains, including cognition, communication and motor abilities,
incorporated all areas of a child's functioning, including age-specific
behaviors. 70 If a child's ability to function within these domains was
substantially impaired, the child would be considered disabled be-
cause. his or her impairment was of comparable severity to a qualifying
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409. The
first step paralleled the severe impairment analysis of the second step of the adult analysis.
See id.
62 Id.
63 See id.
61 See id. at 6408.
65 See id. at 6409.
66 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
67 See id.
65 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
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adult." Under the IFA system, children with extreme, marked and at
tunes even moderate impairments could qualify for disability.72 The
regulations gave examples of how a combination of several moderate
impairments could constitute a substantial reduction in functioning,
thus qualifying a child for disability." For example, a child could qual-
ify for benefits when suffering from a combination of moderate im-
pairments that might include: a full scale IQ of seventy-four in cogni-
tive functioning; limited age-appropriate relationships with peers and
adults with occasional serious conflicts with others in social function-
ing; and the frequent inability to complete age-appropriate complex
or simple tasks. 74
C. New Standards Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
The most substantial change to the child disability laws enacted
in 1996 under the PRWORA was the replacement of the "comparable
severity" standard with a specific definition of childhood disability."
Under the new definition, a child's impairment or combination of
impairments must cause more severe limitations than any of the pre-
vious regulations required." PRWORA provides that the child must
suffer from a medically-determinable physical or mental impairment
that results in marked and severe functional limitations." The new
standard eliminates the IFA developed after the Zebley decision, which
71 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
72 See id. A child suffers from a marked limitation when he or she scores two standard
deviations or more below the norm—but less than three standard deviations—on a stan-
dardized test used to measure functional abilities in a development area. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926a(c) (3) (i) (1997). A child suffers from an extreme limitation in a development
area when he or she scores three standard deviations or more below the norm on a stan-
dardized test aimed at measuring functional abilities. See id. Children between birth and
age three who function at one-half of their chronological age or less will be determined to
suffer from an extreme limitation. See id. The SSA will also find that children suffer from
an extreme limitation if they demonstrate no meaningful functioning in a given area. See
id. Under the 1991 regulations, a child functioning at more than two-thirds, but not more
than three-fourths of his or her chronological age suffered from a moderate impairment.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e (b) (1) (repealed 1996).
n See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
74 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(c) (2) (ii) (repealed 1996).
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (C); Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at
62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
76 Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (c) (1997) with § 416.924e(c) (2) (ii) (repealed 1996).
71 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 211-212, 110 Stat. 2105, 2188-92 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a) (3) (C) (Stipp. III 1997)).
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assessed applicants on a more individualized basis." Instead, children
must meet the more restrictive medical listings."
In compliance with the PRWORA, the SSA has created a four-step
procedure for determining childhood disability. 80
 Similar to the old
three-step procedure, children are first evaluated to determine
whether they are employed. 81 Children engaged in substantial gainful
activity will not qualify for benefits. 82
 Further, the second step is simi-
lar to the previous regulations because it requires the SSA to deter-
mine whether the child has a severe impairment that causes more
than minimal functional limitations.83
 The third step requires that the
impairments or combination of impairments be expected to result in
either death or last for a continuous period of at least twelve
months.84
 The fourth step requires that the impairments result in a
marked and severe functional limitation—moderate impairments are
insufficient to qualify for benefits. 85
The SSA considers an impairment marked and severe if it falls
into one of four categories. 86
 In the first category, an impairment will
be considered marked and severe if a limitation on a specific function
(e.g. walking or talking), or a combination of limitations on specific
functions, is the same as those of a listed impairment. 87 The impair-
ments causing a limitation in this category must be linked to a specific
listing.88
The second category of impairments considered marked and se-
vere consists of episodic impairments such as asthma. 89 A chronic im-
pairment that is characterized by frequent illnesses or attacks, or by
exacerbations and remissions, may qualify as a sufficiently severe im-
pairment to entitle a child to .benefits. 9° The SSA may evaluate chil-
dren suffering from episodic impairments in terms of the specific
78 See id. § 211 (b) (2).
78 See id. § 211(b) (1); Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, 62 Fed. Reg. at
6409-10; Robert L. Raper, An Advocate's Guide to Childhood Disability Under the New Supple-
mental Security Income Standard, 6 KY. CHILDREN'S WI'S. 1 1,4-5 (1998).
80 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924; see also Raper, supra note '79, at 4.
81 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b) (1997).
€'2 See id.
85 See id. § 416.924(c).
84 See id. §§ 416.924(a), 416.925(a).
85 See id. § 416.924(d).
88 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b).
87 See id. §416.926a(b)(1).
88 See Raper, supra note 79, at 7.
89 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b) (3).
8° See id.
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functional limitationsol or through an evaluation of the child's func-
tioning in broad areas of development.92 In the alternative, the SSA
may compare the child's impairment with the listing for an impair-
ment with similar episodic criteria to determine whether the impair-
ment has an impact on the child's ability to function such that it is
functionally equivalent to the severity of one of the listings.° Even if a
child can function adequately between episodes, the child may still be
entitled to benefits if the episodic impairment produces the same
limitations as a listed impairment.94
Children who suffer from functional limitations related to treat-
ment or medication may qualify for disability benefits under the third
category.95 In instances where the length of the treatment or the
treatment itself causes marked and severe functional limitations, a
child may be entitled to benefits." In these situations, the child is
evaluated in relation to limitations on a specific function, or in broad
areas of development or functioning, or the child's functional limita-
tions are evaluated in comparison to the criteria in listings based on
treatment or tnedication. 97
The fourth, and the most complex, category set forth in the new
regulations examines six broad areas of a child's development or
functioning." When a child applies for benefits, the SSA examines
the extent of his or her functional limitations in each of the areas af-
fected by the impairment." The SSA also examines the impact of the
limitation in one area upon the child's development in other areas.'"
The effect of a child's impairment on physical and mental function-
ing is examined in light of the impairment itself, the age of the child
and the ability of the child to be tested.m In addition, the SSA will
examine any help the child needs in light of its appropriateness given
the child's age. 102 The areas of development or functioning include:
cognition/communication; motor skills; social skills; responsiveness to
91 See id. § 416.926a(b) (1).
92 See id. § 416.926a(b) (2). See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion on the broad areas of functioning.
95 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b) (3).
94 Sec id.
95 See id. § 416.926a(b) (4).
96 See id.
97 See id.
95 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b) (2).
" See id. § 416.926a(c) (1) (i).
'00 See id.
10 See id. § 416.926a (c) (2).
102 See id.
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stimuli; personal development; and concentration, persistence or
pace. 1°3 Not all of the six areas apply to each age group. 104 Rather, sec-
tion 416.926a(c) (4) of the Code of Federal Regulations defines each
area of development and assigns them to particular age groups. 1 °5 For
example, children from birth to age one may be evaluated based on
their responsiveness to stimuli, whereas children between the ages of
three and eighteen may be evaluated for their personal development
and their ability to care for their own health and safety (e.g. feeding,
dressing and bathing). 1116
 Furthermore, the regulation offers descrip-
tions for age-appropriate behavior within each development area. 107 If
a child has a marked disability in any two of these categories, or an
extreme impairment in any one category, the SSA will determine the
child to be disabled.'"
A child suffers from a marked limitation when he or she scores
two standard deviations—but less than three standard deviations—
below the norm on a standardized test used to measure functional
abilities in a development area.'" The SSA will also determine that a
child from birth to age three who functions at one-half, but not more
than two-thirds, of his or her chronological age within a development
area suffers from a marked limitation. 110 A marked limitation may also
arise not only when an impairment limits several activities or func-
tions, but also when a single impairment interferes seriously with the
child's functioning." Children between the ages of three and eight-
een suffering from an impairment that is "more than moderate" and
"less than extreme," will qualify as having a marked limitation. 112 No
single moderate limitation, or even a combination of moderate limita-
tions, will constitute a marked limitation. 115
A child suffers from an extreme limitation in a development area
when he or she scores three standard deviations or more below the
norm on a standardized test aimed at measuring functional abili-
1°3 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c)(4) (i)—(vi).
104 See id. § 416.926a(c) (4) (iv)—(vi).
1 °5 See id. § 416.926a (c) (4) (i)—(vi).
100 See id. § 416.926a(c) (4) (iv), (v).
1 °7 See id. § 416.926a(c) (5) (i)—(iv).
1138 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b) (2), (c).
1 °° See id. § 416.926a(c) (3)(i) (A).
no See id. § 416.926a(c) (3) (i) (B).
111 See id. § 416.926a(c) (3) (i) (C).
112 See id.
112 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c) (3)(i)(C); SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF
DISABILITY, PUB. No. 64-075, CHILDHOOD DISABILITY TRAINING STUDENT MANUAL 15
(1997).
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ties. 114 Children between birth and age three who function at one-half
of their chronological age level or less suffer from an extreme limita-
tion. 115 Furthermore, the SSA will find that children who demonstrate
no meaningful functioning in a given area suffer from an extreme
limitation. 116 hi addition, the SSA may find an extreme limitation hi a
function area by combining several limitations within that function
area. 117
II. THE REASONING BEHIND THE CHANGES TO SSI AND THE
ANTICIPATED IMPACTS
One of the key reasons Congress passed the PRWORA was to rein
in the skyrocketing number of children receiving disability benefits. 118
Allegations that children with "mild" disorders received benefits and
that sonic children were being "coached" to manipulate the process
fueled public and Congressional sentiment against the old regula-
tions. 119 Studies by the SSA, the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
and the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), however, indicated
that the majority of the growth in the number of children receiving
disability benefits resulted not from the IFA standards themselves, but
from an increase in children with mental impairments who qualified
under new and more inclusive listings in addition to the IFA. 129 De-
spite the results of these studies and their failure to find indications of
significant abuse of the SSI program, Congress passed the PRWORA
and mandated an end to the IFA determination. 121
114 See20	 § 416.926a(c) (3) (ii) (A).
115 See id. § 416.926a(c) (3) (ii) (B) .
116 See id. 416.926a (c) (3) (ii) (C).
117 See id,
118 See Review of Social Security Administration's Implementation of New SSI Childhood Disabil-
ity Legislation: The Childhood Disability Program (visited Oct. 3, 1998) <http://www.ssa.gov/
policy/child003.htinl> [hereinafter Childhood Disability Program].
119 See id.
120 See id. (citing GAO/HEHS, 94-225, RAPID RISE IN CHILDREN ON SSI DISABILITY
ROLLS FOLLOWS NEW REGULATION (1994); 01G, A-03-94-02602, CONCERNS ABOUT PAR-
TICIPATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME
PROGRAM (1994); SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY OF TI-
TLE XVI CHILDHOOD DISABILITY CLAIMS (1994); 01G, A-03-94-02603, SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME: DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS FOR CHILDREN WITH MENTAL IMPAIR-
MENTS (1995)).
121 See Childhood Disability Program, supra note 118.
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A. Growth in the Disability Rolls
In the early 1990s, the number of children receiving disability
benefits increased dramatically. 122 Between 1990 and 1996, the num-
ber of children receiving SSI benefits increased from approximately
350,000 to more than 965,000.123 Roughly one third of the children
receiving benefits during this time became eligible under the IFA
procedure, enacted after Zebley. 124
In the ten years preceding the Zebley decision, however, the num-
ber of children receiving benefits increased modestly, rising from
228,000 to 340,000. 125
 Between 1990 and 1996, the years between Ze-
bley and the passage of the PRWORA, the number of children receiv-
ing benefits nearly tripled. 125
 Further, between 1990 and 1996, the
costs of the childhood disability program rose from $1.3 billion to
over $5 billion. 127
The increase in the number of children receiving disability
benefits did not occur solely because of the new standards. 125
 Updated
listings for evaluating mental disorders in children were published in
1990, making benefits available to some children previously ineligible
for disability coverage.125
 A Congressional requirement that the SSA
make outreach efforts to locate children who qualified for benefits
and a rise in the number of children living below the poverty line also
contributed to the increase. 1" .
As a result of the new regulations passed in accordance with the
PRWORA, the SSA anticipates saving $4.7 billion to SSI programs over
a six-year period. 131 An additional savings of $455 million is expected
in Medicaid expenditures before 2002. 132 Further savings are ex-
pected in the form of reduced Medicaid program outlays for states.'"
122 See id.
123 See Social Security Administration, A Factsheet from Social Security (visited Oct. 3,
1998) <http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/wrchilcl.html> [hereinafter Scoial Security Factsheeti.
124 See id.; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990).
123 See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 541; Childhood Disability Program, supra note 118.
126 See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 541; Childhood Disability Program, supra note 118.
127 See Childhood Disability Program, supra note 118.
I" See id.
129 See id.
130
 See id.
133 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6417
(1997).
132 See id.
133
 See id.
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B. Many Children Impacted by Reforms
In December of 1996, the SSA sent letters notifying over 263,000
children that their cases would be reviewed under the new stan-
dards.'" The PRWORA required that the SSA complete the reassess-
ments within one year of its passage)" The Balanced Budget Act of
1997 extended this deadline to February of 1998. 136 Under these
timelines, no child lost benefits before July 1, 1997, even if the SSA
completed a child's redetermination before that date.' 37
Initially, the SSA anticipated that 135,000 children would ulti-
mately lose disability benefits under the new definition and regula-
tions)" Revised estimates suggest that it is more likely that 100,000
children will lose their monthly benefits)" The newer estimates an-
ticipate that upon a second review of 45,000 cases, 17,000 will be re-
opened with benefits restored.m Additionally, the Commissioner of
Social Security; Kenneth Apfel, announced in December of 1997 that
those children who had lost benefits and had not appealed would
have a second opportunity to do so."I This opportunity to appeal was
also expected to result in renewed benefit payments to some children
initially terminated from the rolls."2
C. Further Impacts on Children Through the Redetermination Process
The PRWORA required the Commissioner of the SSA to rede-
termine the eligibility of any individual under eighteen whose benefits
might be terminated by the new legislation. 143 The Act also requires
the Commissioner to perform eligibility redeterminations every three
154 See Social Security Factsheet, supra note 123.
155 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 211(d) (2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2190-91 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c (a) (3) (H) (Supp. III 1997)).
158 See Social Security Administration, Review of Social Security Administration's Implemen
tation of New SSI Childhood Disability Legislation: The Executive Sununaq (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<littp://www.ssa.gov/policy/child002.html > [hereinafter Executive Summary].
157 See Social Security Factsheet, supra note 123.
155
 See id.
I" See Executive Summary, supra note 136.
140 See Social Security Adminstration, Review of Social Security Administration's Implementa-
tion of New SSI Childhood Disability Legislation: Conclusion (visited Oct. 3, 1998) <hup://
www.ssa.gov/policy/child009.
141 See Social Security Administration, SSA Will Review 45,000 Cases of Children who had
SSI BenOts Ceased, Offer Second Chance for' ppeal to All at 1 (visited Oct. 3, 1998) <http://
www.ssa.gov/press/childhood_press.html >.
142 See id.
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a) (3) (H) (Supp. III 1997).
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years if the child suffers from an impairment that is likely to im-
prove."4 Additionally, all children receiving benefits must undergo a
disability redetermination within one year of their eighteenth birth-
day to determine whether their impairments meet the criteria for
adult disability benefits." 5
III. THE NEW REGULATIONS FAIL TO CONSIDER THE TOTALITY
OF A CHILD'S IMPAIRMENTS IN MAKING DISABILITY
DETERMINATIONS
The new regulations promulgated by the SSA do not acknowl-
edge the potentially severe impact of moderate impairments on a
child's ability to function."6 The second step of the evaluative process
requires that a child demonstrate more than a slight abnormality in
order to qualify for benefits."7 This severity test serves as a floor to the
level of impairment necessary to demonstrate a disability." Under
the new regulations, however, a large gap exists between the floor set
by the severity test and the severity required to qualify for benefits." 9
By requiring that a child either meet a medical listing or demonstrate
two marked functional impairments or one extreme functional im-
pairment, the new regulations ignore a multitude of moderate im-
pairments that, when taken in combination, can become debilitat-
ing. 15° For, instance, the SSA recently denied benefits to Ivan, a ten-
year old, who suffers from mental retardation, ADHD, ODD and enu-
resis. 151 These impairments, although individually not necessarily se-
vere enough to be debilitating, in combination seriously impair Ivan's
ability to function. 152 Chronologically old enough to be in fifth grade,
Ivan is currently completing the third grade and performing reading
' 44 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 211(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2188-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a) (3) (H) (Stipp. III 1997)).
145
 See id. § 212(b).
140 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c) (3) (1) (C) (1997).
"7 See id. § 416.924(c).
148 See id.
145 Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c) (explaining Step Two of the disability determination
process), with § 416.924(d) and § 416.926a(c) (explaining finictional equivalence test and
requirement of one extreme or two marked impairments to qualify for benefits).
158 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924(d), 416.926a(c).
151 See Stein et al., supra note 1, at 10. Ivan was initially denied benefits by the state Dis-
ability Determination Service ("DDS") in May 1997. See id. On reconsideration, the state
DDS denied his application again in July 1997. See id.
152 See id.
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and arithmetic at a pre-first grade level)" Ivan has failed to be pro-
moted to the next grade twice. 154 He has serious difficulties following
directions, is easily frustrated and has a history of impulsive and vio-
lent behaviors at home and at school. 155 Despite his functional
difficulties, which require therapeutic support and behavioral inter-
ventions, Ivan's impairments were considered moderate, not marked,
and thus, he did not qualify for benefits. 156
Under the regulations first established in response to Zebley,
moderate impairments played an important role in the IFA. 157 A child
suffering from moderate impairments in three areas, or a marked im-
pairment in one area and a moderate impairment in another, would
qualify for benefits. 15B A child functioning at more than two-thirds,
but not more than three-fourths, of his or her chronological age suf-
fered from a moderate impairment. 159 Under the 1996 regulations,
however, moderate impairments are not even defined because the
administration will not count any number of moderate impairments
toward a finding of disability.m
The IFA regulations accounted for the individuality of the child
as he or she grew older. 161 Under the IFA, the definition of a moder-
ate impairment was more flexible to accommodate the varying needs
of older children and included impairments that ranged from those
just shy of marked to an impairment slightly more debilitating than a
mild impairment. 162 The IFA defined disabilities in younger children
in terms of developmental delay. 163 Evaluations of developmental de-
lays looked less at the context of the child and more at the medical or
functional development compared to the. general population of chil-
dren that age.164 For older children, the guidelines were less precise
because they generally described disabilities in terms of specific kinds
of age-appropriate activities or abnormal behaviors. 165 Determinations
thus required an individualized examination into the context sur-
155
 See id.
11 $4
 See id.
155 See id.
156 See Stein et al., supra note 1, at 10.
157 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e (c) (2) (i)—(ii) (repealed 1996).
I" See id.
159 See id. § 416.924e(b) (1).
160 See id. § 416.926a(c); SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, MOM note 113, at 15.
161 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(b) (repealed 1996).
162 See id. § 416.924e(b) (2).
163 See id. § 416.924e(b) (2) (i).
lco' See id. § 416.924e(b).
165 See id. § 416.924e(b) (2).
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rounding that child's behavior, including performance in school,
work or other relevant settings. 166 It required careful evaluation and
judgment in each individual case, taking into account the child's age
and other relevant factors. 167 The IFA determinations for younger
children were less individualized than those of older children. 168
The current evaluative scheme results in a less individualized as-
sessment of children applying for benefits. The scheme fails to con-
sider the totality of a child's impairments by ignoring any moderate
impairments the child possesses. These regulations, therefore,
conflict with the express provision of the Act as interpreted by the
courts and with the stated policy of the SSA.
A. The Courts Require Consideration of Combination of Impairments
A series of cases decided in the 1980s interpreted the Act to re-
quire the SSA to consider the combined effects of an individual's
various impairments when evaluating an adult claimant for disabil-
ity. 169
 The courts ruled that the SSA must consider the totality of a
claimant's physical and mental impairments to comply with the statu-
tory requirements of the Act. 17° With this series of cases, the courts
overturned the SSA's policy between 1980 and 1984 of refusing to
consider non-severe impairments in totality. 171
In 1984, in Bowen v. Heckler, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that where a claimant has alleged a mul-
titude of impairments, a claim for disability benefits may exist even
though none of the impairments considered individually is dis-
abling. 172 The claimant, who suffered from poor eye-hand coordina-
tion, low-back pain, leg pain and a learning handicap, sued the SSA
after being denied benefits.'" The Eleventh Circuit remanded the
case for entry of an order granting benefits to appellant. 174 Noting
several previous cases that served as persuasive authority, the court
stated that addressing the combined effects of appellant's impair-
168 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(b) (repealed 1996).
1°7 See id. § 416.924e(b)(1).
168 See id. § 416.924e(b).
I" See Johnson v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 346, 352 (7th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Secretary of
Health and Human Servs., 795 F.2d 1118, 1127 (1st Cir. 1986); Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
17° SeeJohnson, 922 F.2d at 352; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1127; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635.
171 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 352; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1127; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635.
172 See 748 F.2d at 635.
173 See id. at 630.
174
 See id. at 637.
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mews was a crucial issue, neglected by the Secretary and the adminis-
trative review process. 175 In addition, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of evaluating the totality of physical and mental impairments in
a disability determination.'" Thus, the court held that the SSA must
consider the effect of all alleged impairments in determining disabil-
ity eligibility.!"
In 1986, in McDonald v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that various
physical, mental and psychological defects, each non-severe in and of
itself, might make it impossible for a claimant to work when com-
bined, potentially qualifying the applicant for disability benefits.'" In
McDonald, the United States District Court for Massachusetts certified
a class action, of which the plaintiff was a named member, for all Mas-
sachusetts disability applicants who had been denied benefits under
"Step Two" of the evaluative process on the ground that they did not
have a severe impairment.'" The action challenged the severity test,
prescribed in Step Two, for determining eligibility for disability
benefits and the policy of the Secretary for not reevaluating the
claims of applicants whose non-severe, multiple impairments were not
considered in combination under previous regulations.ls°
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding the se-
verity regulation invalid and ordering the SSA to consider the com-
bined effects of all impairments when evaluating claims for disabil-
ity.'" On the severity issue, the First Circuit ruled that the Step Two
regulation was a valid exercise of the Secretary's regulatory powers. 182
The court held that the Secretary's requirement that the applicant
demonstrate a severe impairment constituted nothing more than a de
minimis screening policy aimed at excluding frivolous claims. 185
On the second issue, concerning the combination of non-severe
impairments, the appellate court upheld the district court.'" The
175 Sec id. at 639-35; see genendly Brener] v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1980); Strick-
land v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1980); Farley v. Celebrezze, 315 F.2d 704 (3d Cir.
1963).
"6 See Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635.
177
 See id.
110 See 795 F.2d at 1127.
179 See id. at 1120-21.
180 See id. at 1121.
181 See id.; McDonald v. Heckler, 624 F. Supp. 375,380 (D. Mass. 1985).
182 See McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1122.
155 See id.
184 See id. at 1127.
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court noted that the refusal to acknowledge combinations of non-
severe impairments was as illogical as a mathematician attempting to
prove that because two does not equal four, two plus two could never
equal four. 185 The court recognized that the Act itself speaks in terms
of multiple impairments or abnormalities and, thus, the Secretary's
refusal to acknowledge combinations of impairments was inconsistent
with the Act. 188 Accordingly, although the court upheld the severity
regulation, it overturned the SSA's policy of not considering the com-
bined effect of non-severe impairments in determining disability. 187
In 1989, in Johnson v. Sullivan ("Johnson II"), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the SSA's no-
combination policy was arbitrary and capricious. 188 In Johnson H, the
court reheard a case originally decided in 1985. 189 Johnson v. Heckler
("Johnson I") was a class action suit filed in 1983 challenging the SSA's
Step Two severity regulation and the no-combination policy. 198 In
Johnson I, the Seventh Circuit rejected both the severity regulation and
the no-combination policy. 191 After the United States Supreme Court
approved the severity regulation in Bowen v. Yuckert, the Secretary
challenged the entire decision in Johnson I and the case was reheard
by the district court.192 The district court refused to reverse the de-
termination that the no-combination policy was inconsistent with the
Act.195 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision, and
reasserted its holding in Johnson J, 194 Thus, based upon the plain lan-
guage of the Act and the legislative history of subsequent clarifying
amendments passed by Congress, the court held the no-combination
policy invalid.195
185 See Dixon v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 1494, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), quoted in McDonald,
795 F.2d at 1127.
186 See McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1122, 1127.
187 See id. at 1127.
188 See 922 F.2d at 352.
189 See id. at 350; Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1985).
199 See 769 F.2d at 1204.
191 See id. at 1212, 1215.
192 See Bowen v. Thckert, 482 U.S. 137, 152-54 (1987); Johnson, 922 F.2d at 350.
195 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 349-50; Johnson v. Sullivan, 697 F. Supp. 346, 352 (N.D. III.
1988).
See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 350, 352.
195 See id. at 351-52.
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B. Ignoring Moderate Impairments Violates the Social Security Act and
Contravenes the Stated Policy of the SSA
The SSA maintains that it has a longstanding policy to consider
all of the effects of a child's impairments in assessing whether that
child is disabled. 1 " With the exception of the four-year period be-
tween 1980 and 1984, the SSA has considered non-severe im-
pairments in combination since the 1967 inception of social security
disability benefits. 197 In publishing the 1996 regulations, the SSA
stated that it was adding language to the regulations to make this pol-
icy clear.'" The regulations now state that in determining disability
for children, the SSA will consider all relevant evidence and consider
the combined effects of all impairments upon the child's overall health
and functioning. 1"
The Act provides that in determining whether an individual's
physical or mental impairment(s) qualifies for benefits, the SSA must
consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments
without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered sepa-
rately, would be of sufficient severity.200 The statute states:
(G) In determining whether an individual's . . . impairment
or impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that .. .
[they] could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the
Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the combined ef-
fect of all of the individual's impairments without regard to
whether any such impairment, if considered separately,
would be of such severity. . . . [T]he combined impact of the
impairments shall be considered throughout the disability
determination process."'
This portion of the statute pertains to both adult and child disability
provisions."2 Under the current regulations, however, if a child's im-
pairment falls within a broad area of functioning and is not "marked"
16 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6411
(1997) (explaining 20 C.F.R. § 416.906).
I" See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 350; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1120; 20 C.F.R § 404.1522 (re-
pealed 1984).
196 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. at 6411 (ex-
plaining 20 C.F.R. § 416.906).
m See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a), (f) (1997).
2% See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a) (3) (G) (Stipp. III 1997).
401 See id. (emphasis added).
26.2 	id. § 1382c.
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or "extreme," it does not figure into the SSA's determination of dis-
ability." ThuS, a child suffering from numerous moderate disabilities,
ranging across broad areas of functioning and resulting in significant
overall functional limitations, will not qualify for benefits under the
current scheme."
Johnson, Bowen and McDonald focused on the SSA policy that ex-
isted from 1980 to 1984, which refused to acknowledge adult impair-
ments in combination." Although the SSA's refusal to consider mod-
erate functional limitations for children is less explicit and applies to
children rather than adults, the logic behind these decisions is still
applicable." The SSA's failure to acknowledge moderate disabilities
in children is as egregious as its prior refusal to address combinations
of impairments in adultS.207 The end result of such a policy is that
children with extreme disabilities are denied access to disability
benefits.
McDonald reasoned that although a single non-severe impairment
does not meet the disability requirements, it does not follow that a
combination of such impairments could not qualify an applicant for
benefits." The current SSA regulations fail to recognize that non-
marked and non-extreme impairments could, in combination, render
a child disabled within the meaning of the statute.2® Instead, the
regulations currently suggest that simply because a single moderate
impairment is not sufficient to qualify a child for benefits, no combi-
nation of moderate impairments could result in a disability determi-
nation.21° For instance, George, an eight-year old with a history of
borderline intellectual functioning, ADHD and otitis media—a recur-
ring condition of liquid in the inner ear—was recently denied
benefits.211 George struggles in school, is disruptive, falls out of his
chair and throws temper tantrums. 212 He appears to be suffering from
205 See20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c).
204 See id.
205 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 348; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1126; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635.
206 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 348; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1126; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635; 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(c).
207 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 348; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1126; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635; 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(c).
208 See 795 F.2d at 1127.
2" See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c).
210 See id.
211 See Stein et al., supra note 1, at 11. George was initially denied benefits in October
of 1997. See id. On reconsideration, the DDS again denied George's application in April of
1998. See id.
212
 See id.
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a developmental regression that worsens as he ages and does not re-
spond to medication or therapeutic behavioral interventions. 213 The
money from the SSI program could be used by children like George
to pay for additional therapy, medication and educational assis-
tance. 214 The problem is that no two of George's impairments rise to
the level of marked disabilities. 215 Because George's impairments are
only considered moderate, he was not found disabled.216 Thus, chil-
dren like George who not only suffer from borderline intellectual
functioning, ADHD and otitis media, but who are also affected with a
mild form of asthma, speech and language delays, ODD and diabetes,
will still not qualify for disability benefits because all of their impair-
ments are considered moderate.2 " Like the mathematician who ar-
gues that two and two cannot equal four because two does not equal
four, the SSA regulations defy common sense. Furthermore, the
regulations violate the Act, neglecting the holdings of the Johnson, Bo-
wen and McDonald courts.218
The regulations are also inconsistent in their treatment of indi-
viduals with moderate impairments, resulting in the SSA granting
benefits to some while denying them to others with similar disabilities.
When a child demonstrates that his or her impairment meets a listing
requirement, the SSA considers the combined effects of all of a
child's impairments—even moderate impairments—on the child's
overall health and functioning. 219 A child with a listed disability will
automatically qualify for benefits. 22° Not all of the listings require
marked limitations in two functioning areas, or a single extreme limi-
tation; rather, the listings look to the total impact of a child's impair-
ments. 221 Therefore, in some instances moderate impairments can
meet a listing and thus, the regulations governing disability determi-
nations acknowledge that a child with marked impairments in fewer
than two domains and without an extreme impairment may be
215 sr, id,
214 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 212(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2192-93 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(H)(ii) (11)) (requires representative's payee to use benefits for treatment); Stein et
al., supra note 1, at 11.
215 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (c) (3) (1997); Stein et al., supra note 1, at 11.
219 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (c) (3); Stein et al., supra note 1, at 11.
217 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926m(c) (3); Stein et al., supra note 1, at 11.
218 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 352; McDonald, 795 F.2(.1 at 1127; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635.
218 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a).
229 See id.
221 See id. § 416.925(b) (2).
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sufficiently disabled to qualify for benefits. 222 For children not meet-
ing a listing, however, the totality of their disability can never be fully
evaluated because the new regulations only consider functional im-
pairments that qualify as marked or extreme and ignore those that
fall within the moderate impairment category. 225
Additionally, the regulations that ignore moderate impairments
contravene the state) policy behind the Act that looks to the totality
of a person's impairments in determining whether he or she qualifies
for benefits.224 The policy of refusing to combine non-severe impair-
ments in adults was an explicit policy, whereas the current decision to
neglect the moderate impairments of children is not explicitly stated
within the regulations. 225 The Childhood Disability Training Manual
published by the SSA, however, expressly states that moderate limita-
tions cannot be "added-up" to equal a marked limitation. 226 Although
the failure to acknowledge moderate disabilities is more the practical
result of the current regulation construct than an explicit policy to
disregard such impairments, the result remains a failure to take into
account the total effect of a child's impairments. The courts refused
to accept such a request when it applied to adults in Bowen, Johnson
and McDonald.227 For example, the applicant in Bowen demonstrated
that several non-severe impairments, when combined, can result in a
sufficiently severe disability to prevent an adult from worldng.228 A
child could easily suffer from similar impairments, creating a substan-
tial inability to function within a school or social setting. Under the
current regulations, however, if only one of those impairments rises to
a marked level and the remainder reach only moderate levels of im-
pairment, that child will not receive benefits 2 29 As a result, the totality
of the child's disability is never considered and the child may not re-
ceive the treatment or medication the child could have otherwise ob-
tained with benefits. 250
222 See id.
225
 See id.
224 See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6411
(1997).
225 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522 (repealed 1984).
228 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 113, at 15.
227 See Johnson, 922 F.2d at 352; McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1127; Bowen, 748 F.2d at 635.
228 See 748 F.2d at 635.
229 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c).
23° See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-93, § 212(a)(ii) (11), 110 Stat. 2105, 2192 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(l1) (ii) (H) (Stipp. III 1997)). During a child's eligibility redetermination, the
PRWORA requires the representative payee of the child to present evidence at the time of
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IV. THE NEW 	 DISABILITY REGULATIONS DRAW
ARBITRARY DISTINCTIONS AND NEGLECT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
BEHIND SSI
Proponents of the current SSI regulations may argue that the
regulations remain true to the letter of the PRWORA and uphold the
legislative intent of that statute. 231 The conference report that accom-
panied the PRWORA indicates that the conferees intended needy
children with severe disabilities to qualify for SSI. 232 Although the
conference report indicates that a child needs at least two marked
impairments to qualify for disability, the PRWORA standard itself does
not prevent children with multiple moderate disabilities from qualify-
ing.233 To qualify, children suffering from multiple moderate impair-
ments must demonstrate that they suffer from a severe diSability that
prevents gainful activity.234 In so doing, children with multiple moder-
ate impairments would probably demonstrate that two marked im-
pairments were equivalent to three or more moderate impairments in
functional shortcomings. 233 If the purpose of childhood disability
benefits is to provide for needy children with severe disabilities, it
would seem arbitrary to deny benefits to a child suffering from multi-
ple impairments simply because the child suffers from three slightly'
less severe impairments rather than two marked impairments. A child
with multiple moderate impairments may be no less disabled than
one with two marked impairments, and thus meets the Congressional
standards to qualify for disability benefits under the PRWORA. 236
A brief examination of the examples of Matthew, Ivan and
George will highlight this discrepancy. 2" Although each of their im-
pairments may fall short of a marked designation, the impairments of
each are severe enough in combination to significantly interfere with
the determination review that the child is, and has been, receiving treatment considered
medically necessary and available for the condition that was the basis of provicling SSI
benefits. See id.
23 ' See Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18, at 62 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6410
(1997).
232 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 328 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2649, 2716.
223 See id.; Personal.
 Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-93, § 211(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2188 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a) (3) (H) (Supp. III 1997)).
234 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.
216 See id. § 416.924e (repealed 1996).
236 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104,-725, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2716.
2" See supra notes 1-9, 151-56 and 211-17 and accompanying text.
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each child's ability to function.238
 What the individual impairments
lack in severity is made tip for by the total combined effect the im-
pairments have on these children and others like them.
Furthermore, the current regulations create a situation in which
a child may be denied benefits while an adult suffering from the same
impairments would qualify. The possibility that a child just shy of her
eighteenth birthday would be denied benefits and then qualify only
days later under the adult standard demonstrates the arbitrariness of
the current differences between the adult and childhood disability
regulations. In Zebley, the United States Supreme Court expressed
concern over this possibility. 239
 The SSA should heed that concern
and work to eliminate the possibility of disparate treatment between
adult and child applicants.
Moreover, drawing an arbitrary line between multiple moderate
impairments and a lesser number of more severe impairments does
not serve the purposes of the SSI program. The legislative history of
the original statute granting disability benefits indicates that Congress
intended to provide for those who could not provide for them-
selves. 240
 The House Report states: "[i] t is . . . [the] committee's belief
that disabled children who live in low-income households are cer-
tainly among the most disadvantaged of all Americans and that they
are deserving of special assistance in order to help them become self-
supporting members of our society."241
 Children suffering from mul-
tiple moderate impairments can experience the same difficUlties
functioning in society as those with fewer, more pronounced disabili-
ties. Matthew, Ivan and George each struggle significantly to function
in their enviromnents. 242
Congress intended to provide a source of benefits to the aged,
blind and disabled whose income and resources are below a specified
level.243
 Through the Social Security system, Congress further in-
tended to provide funding and opportunities for those unable to work
or in need of rehabilitation. Congress aimed to help them escape the
dependent situations their disabilities create. 244 Denying those with
23° See Stein et al., supra note 1.
239
 See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,536 (1990).
24° See H.R. REP, No. 92-231, at 603 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 4989,5133—
34.
241 Id.
242
 See supra notes 1-9,151-56, and 211-17 and accompanying text.
243 See 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5133-34.
244 See id. at 5133.
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severe disabilities the benefits available under SSI frustrates both of
these purposes. 245 It limits the ability of poor, disabled children to
gain access to treatment and education that could assist them in cop-
ing with and overcoming their disabilities.
Furthermore, granting disability benefits to children suffering
from multiple moderate impairments does not provide a handout to
non-needy children. Rather, it opens the door to those severely dis-
abled children not engaging in gainful activities. 246 Failing to grant
benefits to these children alienates them from society and places the
burden of caring for them on already poor families. Social Security
regulations provide that a child's representative must use a part of the
child's SSI benefits to obtain treatment for that child. 247 Because only
relatively poor families receive SSI benefits, denying those benefits to
children with multiple moderate disorders most likely would result in
a lack of treatment. This not only creates an immediate problem for
the child who never receives treatment, but also creates a long-term
problem. Lack of treatment could result in some children's failure to
participate in educational and rehabilitative programs necessary for
them to become self-supporting adults. Children given proper treat-
ment and rehabilitation have a better opportunity to become self-
supporting adults than those denied treatment in their formative
years. Waiting until an individual turns eighteen to provide them with
assistance in -obtaining treatment may prove too late to prevent long-
term dependence on state funding.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court made clear in Zebley that difficulties in ad-
ministering a fair policy did not excuse the SSA from implementing
fair standards, consistent with the stated policy of the agency. Consis-
tent with Zebley, Johnson, Bowen and McDonald, the SSA needs to recon-
struct its regulations to conform with both the letter and spirit of the
Act by providing benefits to those children suffering from multiple
moderate impairments that render them .disabled. Not only do the
current regulations violate the requirement that the Act look at non-
245 See id.
245 Both the employment regulation and the severity regulation remain intact in the
assessment of childhood disability as steps one and two of the process. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924 (1997).
247 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-93, § 212(a) (ii) (II), 110 Stat. ,2105, 2192 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(H) (ii) (II) (Stipp. III 1997)). .
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severe impairments in combination, but the regulations are internally
inconsistent because they fail to consider the totality of the applicant's
impairments. Furthermore, the regulations promote. bad public pol-
icy and are contrary to the legislative intent of the Act. The SSA can-
not hide behind the difficulties of creating a manageable regulatory
scheme that acknowledges the potential role of moderate impair-
ments in establishing a disability. Rather, the SSA must return to a full
consideration of the totality of a child's impairments in determining
disability benefits.
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